Skip to main content

Western Sahara: two proposals of solution (article by Boukhari Ahmed)

Submitted on

Madrid, Oct 29, 2012 (SPS) - The POLISARIO Representative to the United Nations, Mr. Boukhari Ahmed, confirmed that the negotiations, between Frente POLISARIO and Morocco under UN auspices, should place the centre of gravity in consulting the Saharawi people and its purpose lies in removing the obstacles to the self-determination referendum, in an article published Friday by the Spanish Newspaper El Pais.


The article comes on the eve of the visit of UN Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Mr. Christopher Ross to Spain, as a part of tour to North Africa and Europe.


Complete text of the article (translation):


“Western Sahara: Two Proposals of Solution


The negotiation should place the centre of gravity in a referendum for the Sahrawi people


BUJARI AHMED, 26 October 2012


The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, will probably pass by Madrid on 27 October on his tour to the region, whose purpose is, according to the announcement by the UN, “to exchange views with key interlocutors on how to accelerate progress toward the central objective set forth in successive Security Council resolutions, in other words, a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara”.


Ross should have conducted this trip in May, had it been for the curious and surprising Moroccan decision to end cooperation with him. Ross returns to the field with a mission to “accelerate progress towards its ultimate goal.” This will require re-examining, on the one hand, the causes that have led to the current impasse and, on the other, the consistency of the different proposals of solution that are currently on the Security Council table.


The current process that he leads on behalf of the UN did not begin actually in 2007, in Manhasset, but in 1979. In that year, Resolution 3437 (1979) of the General Assembly urged Morocco “end its military occupation of Western Sahara and to negotiate with the Frente POLISARIO, as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people, the terms of a cease- fire and modalities of a referendum on self-determination.”


The OAU tried to go down this path and, when it was confronted with the Moroccan refusal in 1983, it decided to admit the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a full member. Morocco angrily withdrew from the Organisation and its anger lasts until today. In 1991, the persistence of the UN and the OAU and the result of 16 years of war convinced Morocco to accept the holding of a self-determination referendum in which the people of Western Sahara could choose between integration with Morocco or independence.


MINURSO was deployed in the territory to organise the referendum in February 1992.


The rest is known. In late 1988, Rabat reached the conclusion that the referendum would inevitably lead to the independence of Western Sahara and decided to take it over.


After rejecting the Baker Plan, in April 2004 Rabat communicated to the UN Secretary- General, Kofi Annan, that it would oppose any peace plan that would include the option of independence of Western Sahara, arguing that independence “would call into question the Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.” Kofi Annan responded in his report of October 2004 that the “option of independence had already been accepted by Morocco in the settlement plan.” Just two weeks ago, the report of the U.S. Department of State submitted to the Congress stressed that “Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, a position that is not accepted by the international community.” The report goes further and states that “Morocco is not considered by the UN the de jure administering power of the territory.” Actually, the administering power is Spain, although it is still avoiding this truth.


In June 2007, encouraged by some sectors of the Bush Administration, Chirac himself, Zapatero and later on Sarkozy, Morocco presented to the Secretary-General its famous proposal of “autonomy", which was immediately countered by the proposal of the Frente POLISARIO. The Security Council took note of the two proposals without describing any of them as “serious and credible” as Morocco claims. One need only to read the text of Resolution 1754 (2007). Based on these developments, we began the Manhasset process in June 2007.


The “third way” proposed by Rabat is actually a unilateral solution aimed at legitimising “spoils of war.” Its deadly sin lies in the unrealistic assumption that the international community and the Frente POLISARIO would accept from the outset its basic premise, i.e. the unilaterally proclaimed Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.


For Rabat, self-determination is secondary, superfluous, and its function is to “confirm an agreement” which must deal only with the incorporation of the territory into Morocco, and this should be the only goal of the negotiation.


The Sahrawi proposal differs from the Moroccan one to the extent that it makes allowances for all the options recognised by the UN for a decolonisation problem and therefore all solutions, including independence, autonomy or integration, which are the same thing under a different name.


Consequently, the negotiation, in the view of the Frente POLISARIO, should place the centre of gravity in consulting the Saharawi people and its purpose lies in removing the obstacles to the self-determination referendum.


This view has been revalidated by the UN Secretary-General in his report of April 2011, when he stressed that “determining the views of the Saharawi people is the central element in the search for any just and lasting solution.”


The novel element contained in the proposal of the Frente POLISARIO is an invitation to Morocco to have a broad-minded attitude and to make good use of the process to envisage the mutually advantageous terms contained in the two cases—independence or autonomy—which would come into effect the day following the results of the referendum. Morocco continues to turn its back on this invitation
Five years have passed since the start of the Manhasset process, and one is forced to admit that it is leading nowhere for the simple reason that the Moroccan proposal, as it is presented, undermines the foundations and rationale for a process of self-determination relating to a decolonisation conflict. Meanwhile, Morocco wants to appear as a volunteer to “jump into fire” far in the Sahel and the Middle East. The evasive strategy is evident. Some may be pushing the young king that far in exchange for some “promises”. Anyway, encouraged by some quarters, inside or outside, Morocco continues to orbit far from reality, and far from common sense and international legality. Ultimately, this does not do any good to Morocco or the region. That orbit and its corollary in terms of the violation of human rights—“a matter of great concern” even for the Department of State—and the plunder of the wealth of a defenceless people, can only aggravate the tension, move the Sahrawis and Moroccans farther from each other, and complicate Ross’s mission.


Bujari Ahmed is the representative of the Frente POLISARIO at the UN.” (SPS)


090/089/000